Charles L. Black, Jr. by Greenberg, Jack
Charles L. Black, Jr.
Jack Greenbergt
I met Charlie Black not long after I came to work at the NAACP Le-gal Defense Fund in 1949. Around the same time, he began teaching atColumbia and was quickly recruited into LDF's informal group of aca-demic advisers. In January 1950, he signed the amicus curiae brief of theCommittee of Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education inSweatt v. Painter,1 which we took as an indication that he was one of us.While the authors of that brief were such stalwarts as Erwin N. Gris-
wold, Edward Levi, Thomas Emerson and John Frank, there was still awidely held mood in the country, in legal education, and indeed, among
some faculty at Columbia at that time (Walter Gellhorn being the most
notable exception), that LDF's enterprise and its effort to overturn racialsegregation were at the very least questionable-politically, socially, juris-prudentially. In the eyes of many lawyers, those who were involved in the
effort were misguided, if not disreputable. For a Texan like CharlieBlack, the disapproval sometimes became opprobrium among fellow
southerners. A.Florida newspaper once called me a Bolshevik-imagine
what some Texans must have said about Charlie!In his work for the LDF on Brown,2 Charlie, who then taught a course
called Equity, focused particularly on the remedial aspect of the case,helping formulate the first and second rearguments in response to theCourt's questions about how to write and administer desegregation de-crees. It didn't take long to find out that he was not merely a great, indeed
spectacular, advocate, but also a towering scholar of constitutional lawand the greatest legal stylist of his generation. Soon I learned that he was(and is) also a poet (his three volumes of poetry have been published, ashe puts it, under the pseudonym "Charles Black"), trumpeter, harmonicaplayer, and cornetist (not all played at the same level of accomplishment),painter, long distance jogger, actor,3 and more recently, student of Iceland
and of modern Icelandic.
t Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.1. Brief of Amicus Curiae Committee of Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Educationin Support of Petitioner, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).,2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349U.S. 294 (1955).3. The director of a Yale Repertory Company production of Julius Caesar, in which Charlesplayed Cicero, urged him to shed his Texas drawl. Charles replied, "What makes you think Cicerotalked like a Yankee?"
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When I became Director-Counsel of LDF in 1961, I turned to Charlie
repeatedly for help-out of both concern for the needs of our litigation
program and personal affection. The big new issues of that period 
arose
out of the sit-ins, freedom rides, and demonstrations of Martin 
Luther
King, Jr., whom LDF represented. Foremost among those issues 
was de-
termining what constituted state action under the equal protection 
clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Civil rights demonstrators claimed 
that
they had been arrested, prosecuted, and convicted by the state in 
violation
of the equal protection clause as part of a systematic design to enforce 
the
racial prejudices of the proprietors and the community. The prosecutors
asserted the contrary: arrest, prosecution and conviction, according 
to
them, merely enforced property rights in a neutral manner, and 
were thus
constitutionally indistinguishable from assisting a homeowner's 
decision to
exclude an ordinary unwelcome guest. The Supreme Court went 
to great
lengths not to decide the constitutional issue-probably out of uncertainty
over what the implications of such a decision might be. Instead, 
the Court
decided the demonstration cases on a variety of nonconstitutional statutory
and evidentiary grounds. Charlie was an advocate without equal 
in brief-
ing the constitutional issue, making a forceful case for holding 
that state
action existed, and then offering the Court a way out of deciding 
that
issue by ruling for defendants on some nonconstitutional ground.
We took advantage of Charlie so mercilessly (although to our mutual
pleasure) that he wrote a poem decrying the exploitation:
The Tide Turns At Menemsha Bight (1965)
Each summer while the sun has burned
To Greenberg's bondage I've returned,
And Nabrit, overseer-in-chief,
Has made me slave on writ and brief.
But now, to put the matter clinically,
My epidermis has actinically
So altered been upon this shore,
That I'm an ASP, a WASP no more,
And Chief Bull Connor, were he here,
Would seat me in the bus's rear.
So now the NAACP
Has got to start advancing me!
The best evidence of Charlie's lawyering, scholarship, and style 
is in-
cluded in some of the briefs themselves, documents that are, 
unlike his
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numerous poems, books and articles, not generally available to the average
reader. While these briefs were collaborative efforts, there is no difficulty
identifying those portions that Charlie wrote alone. The following excepts
are from the petitioners' joint brief in Barr v. City of Columbia, Bouie v.
City of Columbia, and Bell v. Maryland:4
There are a number of elements of state involvement in these
cases. These elements are complexly interrelated. The "state action"
issue need not turn on any one of them in isolation, but may be
resolved by consideration of their interrelation; this is not a matter of
softening the focus but of widening the angle of vision. Nevertheless,
analytic clarity requires separate consideration of the several modes
of "state action" here found.
• . . These cases are stronger than Shelley. In Shelley, the state
action immediately involved consisted (aside from the furnishing of
recordation machinery) in keeping the courts open for the filing of
complaints that asked injunctive relief, in granting such relief when
asked by a private party, and in standing by with the contempt ma-
chinery for use in the event the private party might invoke that ma-
chinery. In these cases, the police were either present in advance to
assist the proprietor in maintaining racial discrimination or acted as
formal witnesses to the warning, or both. . . . The public prosecu-
tor, supported by the public fisc, carried the cases to court. Most
crucially, the cases were criminal prosecutions, in which the state
appears as a party, in its own interest, in knowing support of the
discriminatory scheme, which it thereby sanctions within the public
order of its criminal law, and not merely within the framework of its
dealing with private rights. The States of Maryland and South Car-
olina have taken on these cases as their own from the first police-
man's warning to the last argument in this Court; it must be a para-
doxical distinction indeed which could find "state action" in the
private-law umpiring performed by the state in Shelley v. Kraemer,
and not find it here.
The force of this argument is greatly augmented by recurrence to
the basic symmetries of social obligation. The states of South Caro-
lina and Maryland are not proposing that the petitioners be ex-
empted from taxation, or from the duty to obey the general criminal
law. Some of the petitioners are liable to military service, and may
even have to risk their lives to keep safe the cities of Columbia and
Baltimore. Emotion-fraught though they be, these facts are a part of
the framework within which one must construe the Fourteenth
Amendment obligation of South Carolina and Maryland to maintain
4. Brief for Petitioner, Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964), Bouie v. City of Colum-
bia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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legal regimes which do not "deny" to petitioners the equal "protec-
tion" of the laws. The scope of affirmative "protection" required
ought not, as a matter of sound interpretation, be less than what is
decent in face of the fact that the heaviest duties of citizenship, as
well as the privileges of that status, were placed upon petitioners by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Far from decent, it is scandalous that
states imposing the burdens of state citizenship on Negroes, and ben-
efiting from the imposition on them of the duties of federal citizen-
ship, not only should fail to protect them in their right to be treated
equally in fully public places, but should instead place the weight of
law behind their humiliation.5
The Court decided the South Carolina cases by holding that the state
trespass statute did not give adequate notice of what constituted a crime.
6
And because the Maryland prosecution might have abated as a conse-
quence of newly enacted state law which apparently made noncriminal
what previously had been a trespass, namely, a black person's refusal to
leave the premises of a restaurant while seeking service denied on grounds
of race, the Court held that the cases in that state should be remanded to
the state courts to decide whether the judgments of conviction should
abate.7 Petitioners won; no new constitutional doctrine was declared.
Hamm v. City of Rock Hill," decided the next Term, held that the 1964
Civil Rights Act invalidated all pending sit-in convictions, just as Char-
lie's brief had urged. In that brief, he argued:
If these petitioners are now to be punished notwithstanding
§ 203(c) [the .Public Accommodations Section], it will be for having
insisted upon something which the national conscience has now most
decidedly declared they are entitled to insist upon, against a refusal
which the national conscience has now declared affirmatively unlaw-
ful. Their punishment can serve no purpose, for no valid state or
private interest can now be admitted to exist in deterring them or
others from doing what they have done; the only licit deterrence in-
terest now runs the other way. Their punishment would afford the
immoral spectacle of pointless revenge against those whose claim,
substantially, has been validated by national authority. Such a result
ought to be allowed only if the law unequivocally commands it. It is
petitioners' submission that the law actually forbids it-that the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and especially its § 203(c), placed in the
setting of the ancient law expounded in this Court's opinion in Bell
5. Id. at 22-24, 40-41 (emphasis in original).
6. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146
(1964).
7. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
8. 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
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v. Maryland abates these prosecutions and forces their remand for
dismissal.
The nature of the statutes concerned here makes these cases fit the
reason of the rule with a singular aptness. The petitioners, if freed
by operation of this rule, would be the beneficiaries of no subtle gap
in the seisin of the law, no merely technical "repeal" by dubious
implication, no lapse or expiration through inadvertence. What they
did would not have been criminal at all, in the states concerned,
before 1959 or 1960, or could be made so only by a construction of
prior state law so bizarre as to violate due process.'
The Court agreed with this argument, although the vote was 5-4, and
the individual Justices' expressions of views on the statutory and constitu-
tional issues were all over the landscape. Once more petitioners won; once
more no new constitutional law was declared.
Charlie participated in many other cases for LDF, while pursuing an
equally active scholarly career in constitutional law and admiralty law
(where he is also a preeminent master). More recently, he has written a
compelling volume on the death penalty, Capital Punishment: The Inevi-
tability of Caprice and Mistake, which has played an important role in
the struggle against the death penalty. Now Charlie, upon retiring from
Yale, is returning to Columbia, just as I have come here as a teacher
myself. Already, he has paid occasional visits to the faculty lounge at
lunch time-most recently discoursing about Rebecca, his newly arrived
granddaughter, who, as he has put it (ever aware of constitutional impli-
cations) became a "citizen of the great state of New Jersey and of the
United States" at 11:31 p.m. on March the 11th, 1986.
I have wondered about how to account for Charlie's particular genius.
Benno Schmidt tells a story which may shed some light. While a student,
Benno approached Charlie for advice in selecting a topic for a Law Jour-
nal note. Benno was looking for something in constitutional law, some-
thing appropriately narrow and specific like the relationship between the
First Amendment and various philosophical theories. Charlie admonished
him: "The liability clause in bills of lading, young man. Bills of lading."
The transcendent importance of the particular for comprehending the
grand scheme of things has always been fundamental to Charlie's concept
of how to understand, explain and persuade. He has, however, far more
than others who also might recognize this truth, ranged over a great uni-
verse of concerns: New Jersey and Iceland, the arts (poetry, music, paint-
ing), community custom, statute, constitutional language and constitu-
9. Brief for Petitioners, at 23, 38 (citations omitted), Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
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tional aspirations. As Charlie might put it, he has worked in the fine
grain, but always with his eye on the greater truth. And he has animated
this perceptiveness with a rare courage to see an idea, indeed an ideal,
through to its ultimate implications, and to press vigorously for its recog-
nition. He has not feared to lose. He was with the winners on racial
segregation. He lost on state action, but clearly he was right, and he actu-
ally triumphed in securing the freedom of those who protested against
racial segregation. He will be with the winners some day when the
United States joins the rest of the Western democratic world on capital
punishment. And in a distinct and measurable way, America's conversion
on that issue, as on so many others, will owe a debt of gratitude to him.
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